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The Free Will Defence was developed by Alvin Plantinga in response to the logical Problem of Evil, which aimed to show that the theistic conceptualisation of God (premise 1 below) is logically inconsistent with the existence of evil. What the Free Will Defence then seeks to do, is to offer a logically consistent possibility that would defeat the logical Problem of Evil. The formulation of the Free Will Defence is as such:
In this paper, I raise a possible rebuttal to the Free Will Defence that analyses premise 5 and reveals that the defence is logically contradictory. However, by questioning an implicit assumption in the rebuttal, I will show how the Free Will Defence can still succeed in posing a logically consistent explanation to the Problem of Evil. I will also discuss a huge implication of this modified defence that many theists may reject.
Before starting, it is worthwhile to note that while it is sufficient for Plantinga to propose a possible and logically consistent account for the coexistence of the theistic God and evil, to successfully rebut him, it is insufficient to just propose a possible and logically inconsistent account. Since the logical Problem of Evil argues that the existences of the theistic God and evil are logically inconsistent, defending it requires proving that all instances are necessarily logically inconsistent. It thus follows that in order to reject premise 5, one must show that in all instances, it is completely impossible that a world with free human creatures and some evil is the best world that God can create. Hence, in order to defend the Problem of Evil, rebuttals positing logical possibilities, such as one arguing that such a world is possibly not the best, would be ignored.
It is also important to define what we mean by free will and the characteristics of a free human creature. The most intuitive conception of free will is the ability to “do what you choose to do”. For example, if I wish to leave the room I am in, and I have the ability to do so, then I have free will. However, this definition seems to be widely rejected, most famously by John Locke, who proposed a similar person physically locked in a room but had wished to stay in the room instead. This definition would determine them to have free will, despite our intuitions claiming otherwise. Thus, the definition of free will should instead be the ability to “do otherwise”. Since the person locked in the room does not have the ability to leave the room, even if they wanted to stay, they therefore would not have free will.
The crux of the rebuttal against the Free Will Defence is that free will is logically incompatible with an omniscient God. However, since premise 1 and 5 are not explicitly contradictory, explicitly contradictory statements must be derived. Hence, starting from premise 5, it is implied that it is possible that God has the ability to create a world with truly free human creatures. Adopting the concept of free will as defined above, we understand that being truly free means that when choosing a choice “C”, and it is in the creature’s power to do otherwise (not “C”), which then implies that God cannot know for sure that the creature will select either option. However, this seems to directly contradict the concept of omniscience, since an omniscient God would know everything, including what the creature would eventually decide to choose. In other words, if it is possible that God can create a world with truly free human creatures, as premise 5 suggests, then we have to conclude that God is not omniscient, thus contradicting premise 1.
It can also be noted that this contradiction arises regardless of opinions on the degree to which free will exists (as long as it is non-zero). For example, some compatibilists might believe that while the world is largely deterministic, there exist tiny instantaneous moments where humans have the ability to exercise their agency. On the other hand, a person subscribing to libertarianism would reject determinism altogether, arguing that we have a significantly larger amount of free will in our lives. However, the rebuttal is still sound for both, since both have at least some degree of free will and necessarily involve some degree of unpredictability, no matter how small, which in turn directly denies all possibility of God being omniscient.
However, there is another implicit assumption that must be challenged, that being God’s existence is limited by the constraints of time, in the same way that we humans are. In other words, we assume that God, while existing infinitely into the past and infinitely into the future, can only be temporally present alongside us. This means that any 2 events that God experiences necessarily occur in separate moments of God’s existence. Thus, omniscience implies that any knowledge God holds about an event that we have yet to experience also occurs in the future relative to God. It is only through this that we can conclude that any knowledge of the future, if necessarily true, denies us of our ability to choose otherwise and, by extension, our free will. On the other hand, if we insist on preserving our free will, then the “future” knowledge is not necessarily true.
In rejecting this assumption, I argue that, possibly, God is timeless and exists beyond the limits of time. In God’s perspective, God experiences the past, present, and future, all at the same moment, while existing at any time, all at once. In fact, this isn’t an impossible concept. The Marvel Cinematic Universe, a popular media franchise, recently introduced a character, monikered “He Who Remains”, who existed outside the flow of time, hence being able to observe all of history and the future all at once. Therefore, this means that it is perfectly reasonable to posit a timeless God who is able to observe all of reality at the same time. God remains omniscient without logically impacting human’s free will, since the knowledge, in God’s perspective, is not of the “future”, but of events occurring at the same moment that God holds that knowledge.
However, a timeless God implies that God would be unable to intervene and act upon the world, which many modern theists would be uncomfortable with. Since God views all possible events all at once, instead of linearly like us temporal beings do, God has no concept of a temporal present and past, and hence cannot act causally. To act on the world is to cause an event that would occur at some time after the action, but God is incapable of such action since God exists outside of time and time-dependent causality. Yet, the non-intervening God is one that many religions will reject. Many religions, for example, hold that God has created the universe, delivered prophecies, and sent rewards and punishments unto man. Additionally, most religions maintain that praying is a key component of our relationship to God, with expectations for their prayers to be answered. Hence, without any logically possible interference of God, adopting the Free Will Defence requires theists to reject many popular religions.